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Jennings: The Commerce Clause and Interstate Carriers
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND INTERSTATE CARRIERS
INTRODUCTION

Federal control over interstate commerce is based upon constitutional authority1 and has never seriously been questioned. There
are, however, many divergent views as to the method of exercising
this power. This exercise of control has been defined as "complete
and exclusive"2 yet such a definition obviously offers no complete
solution for the various problems which arise under this control of
interstate commerce.
One vital problem is the extent to which the Commerce Clause
should be considered as sufficient authorization for federal control
without a specific enactment by Congress in this field. In consequence, laws enacted by Congress under the authority of the Commerce Clause shall be only incidentally discussed. This discussion
shall be limited primarily to the extent of federal control authorized
by the Commerce Clause upon interstate carriers and their passengers.
It is in this field that two recent cases have held that private action
is unconstitutional if it is found to be a burden upon interstate commerce. 3
STAv LAws

The demarcation between state and federal control over commerce
has never been distinctly drawn. Yet it may be stated as a general
rule that state legislation which attempts to levy a direct burden upon
interstate commerce does encroach upon federal powers. Similarly
the states do not have the power to restrain the free movement of such
commerce.4
State statutes controlling separation of the races upon carriers
involved in interstate commerce are void where such laws apply to
interstate passengers. This is looked upon as a vain attempt by the
states to control such commerce under the exercise of its police power.5 The fundamental reason for holding these statutes void is the
1. U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8.

2. BRowN, THE COMMERCIAL PowER oF CONGRESS 291 (1910).

3. Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F. 2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951) ; Whiteside v. Southern
Bus Lines, 177 F. 2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949).

4. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878) ; Cooley v. The Board of Wardens of
the Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, 319 (U. S. 1851). There the court said:
"Now, the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not
only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some
imperatively dertianding a single uniform rule,...."

5. Anderson v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 62 F. 46 (C. C. D. Ky. 1894).

458

Published by Scholar Commons, 1953

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1953], Art. 8

Noms
need for uniformity. Disruption of such uniformity would necessarily result if state statutes concerning interstate passengers were
permitted to stand. No state can bar transportation of passengers
across its own boundaries nor can it reach beyond its boundaries to
control the seating arrangement of passengers. Validatink such state
laws would, therefore, result in diverse seating in interstate journeys.6
It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court, in
holding invalid a state statute requiring that there be no separation of
the races on interstate carriers, said that congressional inaction left
the carriers free to adopt such reasonable rules for the seating arrangement of their passengers as they saw fit. 7 The necessity for
holding these state statutes void becomes apparent when inconsistent
state laws concerning separation of races on carriers are noted. Ten
states require separation of Negroes and whites on motor carriers
while eighteen states prohibit such racial separation. 8 There is no
federal act controlling the separation of the races in interstate commerce. Still the validity of such state statutes is denied upon the
theory that the need for national uniformity supersedes the police
power of the states. The Commerce Clause, even without action by
Congress, establishes the essential immunity from state control of
those subjects of interstate commerce requiring regulation prescribed
by a single authority. 9
PRIVATE ACTION

Until the past several years the federal courts held that the Commerce Clause, in absence of congressional action, did not limit the
rules prescribed by interstate carriers. 10 These rules, however, are
required to meet certain standards, some of which cover the separation of passengers by races upon interstate carriers. The case of
The Sue," decided before the passage of the Interstate Commerce
Act, held that "[t]his discrimination on account of color is one which
it must be conceded goes to the very limit of the right of the carrier to regulate the privileges of his passengers, and it can only be
exercised when the carrier has it in his power to provide for the
passenger, who is excluded from a place to which another person
paying the same fare, is admitted, accommodations equally safe, con6. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946).

7. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878).

8. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946).
9. WAMrNs, SnlPPIRS AND CAI~mERS 6 (4th ed. 1930).

10. Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 72 (1910).
11. The Sue, 22 F. 843 (D. Md. 1885).
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venient and pleasant."' 2 But the courts in requiring equal facilities
decided that this is a duty owed to the public by all common carriers,
and did not base their decision on the Commerce Clause.' 3 Since
the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act 14 in 1887, such unequal
accommodations are definitely prohibited on interstate carriers. The
decision in Henderson v. The United States'5 was based on the Interstate Commerce Act. There the court held unlawful a carrier regulation which required separate dining tables for Negroes and whites.
This decision was based upon the fact that Negroes were sometimes
required to wait for dining facilities even though there was ample
space in the white section of the dining car. This, the Court said,
resulted in discrimination against individuals and was unlawful under
the Interstate Commerce Act. Thus the requirement that public
carriers, intrastate and interstate, provide equal accommodations has
long protected the rights of passengers from unjust carrier regulations. As an added note, the Interstate Commerce Act could be the
instrumentality through which separation of the races is abolished
on interstate carriers. This might be reached by a decision which
holds that segregation of the races in itself is a denial of equal facilities.
Another restriction placed upon the regulations issued by common
carriers is the rule of reasonableness. Carriers are free to make such
rules and regulations for the promotion of their business as they
chose. These regulations, however, must not result in discrimination
and Tnust be reasonable.16 This right of the carrier to make reasonable rules is based upon public policy and the right of private property.17 Whether a carrier regulation is reasonable is essentially a
mixed question of law and fact' 8 and cannot depend upon the status
of the passenger being either intrastate or interstate. 19 One of the
crucial factors in determining whether a carrier regulation is reasonable is the public opinion in the area served which is a unique problem depending upon the particular environment. 20 It is the primary
12. Id. at 843, 22 F. at 846.

13. Gray v. Cincinnati Southern Ry. Co., 11 F. 683 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1882).

14. 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 3 (1).

"It shall be unlawful for any

common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to make or give any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation or locality, or any particular description of traffic, or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage whatsoever."
15. Henderson v. The United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950).
16. WATKiNS, SHrPPZR AND CAuRuas 63 (4th ed. 1930).
17. The W. C. and P. Ry. Co., 55 Pa. 209 (1867).
18. The Sue, 22 F. 843 (D. Md. 1885).

19. Chiles v. Chesapeake &Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 72 (1910).

20. Simmons v. Atlantic Greyhound Corporation, 75 F. Supp. 166 (W. D.

Va. 1947).
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duty of the carrier to operate as efficiently as possible. Thus where*
public sentiment is such that certain regulations are necessary for
the efficient olperation of the carrier, such rules are not unreasonable.
While it has been held that separation of the races upon common carriers is not unreasonable per se,21 the disappearance of -public bias
may some day alter this rule. For if there were no reason for
the separation of the races such separation might become unreasonable per se. At present, however, so long as equal accommodations do not mean identical accommodations, races and nationalities,
under circumstances to be determined on the facts of each base, may
be reasonably separated.
Dismi~cioN

BnwT

mN STATE AcTiON AND PRiVATE ACTIoN

With regard to interstate commerce, our courts have long recognized a distinction between private and state regulation. State laws
which attempt to control separation of passengers on interstate carriers are void under the Commerce- Clause without congressional action.2s Regulations made by interstate carriers controlling separation of races are valid unless they deny equal accommodations to passengers or are unreasonableYP The case of Hall v. De Cuir2 points
out this distinction most clearly. There the Court held invalid a state
statute controlling the separation of passengers on interstate carriers,
but pointed out that carrier regulations of this type were not necessarily unlawful. In holding a carrier regulation concerning passengers lawful, the Court in the Chiles v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Comnpany25 case pointed out that they were not dealing with a
state statute. One of the more recent cases which illustrates this distinction is the case of Sitnmons v. The Atlantic Greyhound Corporalion.26 In that decision a Negro sued the Atlantic Greyhound Corporation for damages resulting from its segregation policy. The court
held that lack of congressional action concerning the regulation of
passengers in interstate service was tantamount to an implied ap21. Logwood v. Memphis & C. Ry. Co., 23 F. 318 (C. C. Tenn. 1885).

22. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878).

The
23. Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 72, 77 (1910).
court said: "The interstate commerce clause of the Constitution does not constrain the action of carriers, but, on the contrary, leaves them to adopt rules
and regulations for the government of their business, free from any interference

except by Congress. Such rules and regulations, of course, must be reasonable,
but whether they be such cannot depend upon a passenger being state or interstate."
24. Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1878).
25. Chiles v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 218 U. S. 72 (1910).
26. Simmons v. Atlantic Greyhound Corporation, 75 F. Supp. 166 (W. D.

Va. 1947).
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proval of the rules made by the carriers, and that so long as it was
reasonable and afforded equal facilities, racial segregation had been
approved by the inactivity of Congress. This case further held that
decisions dealing with state statutes were inapplicable in the instant
decision. The Morgan v. Virginia 7 case held that a state statute
requiring motor carriers to allocate seats to white and colored passengers was a burden upon interstate commerce. This case, however,
pointed with approval to the Chiles v. Chesapeake case which distinguishes between state and private regulations. Thus the courts
in dealing'with interstate carriers have always recognized a difference
between state laws and carrier regulations. The basic reasoning
behind these cases, even though some were decided before the Interstate Commerce Act, is not changed by the Act. The purpose of
section 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act was not to eliminate
separation of the races, but was to eliminate discrimination because
of color. From the beginning it has been recognized that the application of section 3 (1) of the Interstate Commerce Act was to be
directed against discrimination between Negro and white passengers. 25
Until, therefore, it is decided that segregation alone results in discrimination, the Interstate Commerce Act ,does not forbid it. The
question, whether there was a discrimination forbidden by the Interstate Commerce Act, does not rest upon the issue of segregation but
is determined by the test of equality of treatment.2 9
Two recent cases, Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines and Chancev. Lambeth, held that segregation requirements by interstate carriers
resulting in a shifting of seating arrangements throughout a journey
constituted a burden on interstate commerce and were void. In the
case of Chance v. Lambeth"° the court said:
It is true that the regulation of the carrier was not enacted
by state authority, although the power of the state is customarily invoked to enforce it; but we know of no principle of law
which requires" the courts to strike down a state statute which
interferes with interstate commerce but to uphold a railroad
regulation invested with the same vice.
The Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines3 ' case recognized that older
cases have stated that there must be state action before such regulations would be considered a burden upon interstate commerce. But
27. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946).
28.
29.
30.
31.

Henderson v. The United States, 339 U. S. 816 (1950).
Mitchell v. The United States, 313 U. S. 80 (1941).
Chance v. Lambeth, 186 F. 2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951).
Whiteside v. Southern Bus Lines, 177 F. 2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949).
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it does away with this previous rule by stating that, "It must be observed that acts burdening interstate commerce are not, like those
inhibited in the Fourteenth Amendment, limited to state action. Burdens may result from activities of private persons .... -32 It would
siem that these cases need not have been decided on such broad
grounds: The shifting of seating arrangements could' have been
held to be in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. There is no
doubt that a regulation by the carrier which necessitates a repeated
shifting of seats by passengers because of segregation would in itself
be a deprivation of their just rightsas The decision in neither of
these cases, however, is based up5on the Interstate Commerce Act,
nor did they mention the rule of reasonableness nor the equal accommodation requirement. These two cases, then, have questioned the
need of the above two tests in determining whether an interstate
carrier regulation is valid.
To better understand the effect of the Whiteside and Chance cases,
a brief look at the purpose of the Commerce Clause at its inception
as compared to its present status is necessary.
The journals of the Convention and public discussion of the
period offer no conclusive answer to the question [the purpose
of the Commerce Clause]; but it appears that under a form of
expression sufficiently general to give Congress power at all
times to prevent burdensome, conflicting or discriminatory State
legislation, the Convention had prominently in mind the regulation of foreign commerce by the passage of a navigation act and
the imposition of a tariff; while so far as concerned interstate
commerce, nothing more was intended than to enable Congress
to prevent the imposition of duties by particular States upon
articles imported from or through other States."
This, of course, is not to say that Congress does not have the power
to legislate upon private action in connection with interstate commerce, for it is axiomatic that the construction of the Commerce
Clause cannot be limited solely to the particular status of interstate
commerce at the time of its creation. But rather it must broaden
as interstate commerce becomes a more important and complex field
32. Id. at 953.
33. Day v. The Atlantic Greyhound, 171 F. 2d 59 (4th Cir. 1948).

34. P~aNTiCz
=NTr

AxD Ec Ax,

THE Co-n=cZ CLAusE

OF THE

2 (1898); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 5 (1888).

Fromt.AL GovmN-

The court said:

"It is a matter of public history that the object of vesting in Congress the
power to regulate commerce with foreign Nations and among the several States
was to insure uniformity of regulation against conflicting and discriminatory
state legislation."
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and thus accomplish wider purposes as the need arises. 35 Indeed, it
would be a strange construction of any constitution to say that a
general legislative power gave Congress the right to prohibit or invalidate state laws and yet as to private action left Congress powerless. Especially is this so in the field of interstate commerce where
the changing times more and more call for a free and untrammeled
commerce among the several states of the union.8 6 But it is generally the rule that the failure of Congress to legislate should be considered as an expression of its intention not to disturb that which
already exists. 37 Under this view a long line of cases have held that
interstate carriers may make their own rules without regard to the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Thus as the Commerce Clause
of itself does not appear to limit private action concerning interstate
carriers, and as there has been no legislation forbidding separation of
the races by public carriers, it is difficult to see upon what authority
the Chance and Whiteside cases are based. These two cases have
extended the heretofore recognized interpretation placed upon the
Commerce Clause to limits previously considered beyond the courts'
interference. There are matters which involve public rights which
may be presented in such a manner as to be susceptible of judicial determination, but which should not be brought within the cognizance
of the courts. 8 Permeating the previous cases dealing with regulation of private action in interstate commerce has been the idea that
Congress must be the agency to determine whether private action
constitutes an obstruction of interstate commerce. A power which
confers authority to control by legislation should not itself be construed as the power to control. The power to regulate commerce
has been defined as the power to prescribe the rules by which it should
be governed ;89 further, the determination of the rules to be adopted
rests in the discretion of Congress. 40
CONCLUSIOIr
The cases of Chance v. Lambeth and Whiteside v. Southern Bus
Lines held, in effect, a private action to be unconstitutional. These
are unique holdings in the history of judicial decisions in the field
35. PRENTICE AND EGAN,

MNT 35 (1898).

THE CommnncE CLAUsE OF THE FEDERAL GovERN-

36. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. The United States, 175 U. S. 136 (1899).
37. PRENTICE AND EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL GoVERNIMNT 166 (1898).
38. Den v. The Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S.
1856).
39. Cooxi, THE CoMMERcE CLAUSE Or THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 66 (1908).
40. Ibid.
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of interstate commerce. If the application of these decisions were
to be limited to the regulation of carriers requiring separation of
races alone, no great impression would be made upon the field of
constitutional law. But there does not seem to be any intention of
such limitation; rather the very fact that these cases could have been
decided on narrower grounds shows that the courts do not intend
to limit them. Under the ruling in these cases the Interstate Commerce Act, the Anti-Trust Act and any other act dealing with the control of interstate commerce need not have been passed as the action
prohibited by such acts could be found to constitute a burden on
interstate commerce. Thus, while the results reached in the Chance
and Whiteside cases are sound, the grounds upon which these decisions rest are unsteady and doubtful. Congress has passed many
laws restricting private action in connection with interstate commerce.
Such restrictions placed upon private action under the Commerce
Clause should rest within the discretion of Congress, but now "judicial legislation" seems to be in the process of superseding the discretion
of Congress. The result seems to be that the age-old distinction
between state laws and carrier regulations concerning interstate commerce is now under serious attack.
J. JNNINaGs.
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